| Socialism
Now: |
Axis
of Liars?
Cheney and Company Push the Limits of International
Tolerance
GEORGE
W. BUSH stood before the United Nations (UN) General Assembly
on September 12 as judge, jury and would-be executioner
of Iraq.
He threatened more war against
a country already devastated by a decade of bombs and
sanctions–unless the Iraqi government met the conditions
of previous UN resolutions, plus six others requirements
that Bush added for the occasion. Even after Iraq announced
earlier this week that it would accept UN weapons inspectors
unconditionally, the White House was still talking tough.
The offer on inspectors may slow
down the U.S. timetable. But Bush made it clear to the
General Assembly that war is coming. It’s an open-and-shut
case," an unnamed U.S. official told the Boston Globe.
"By going to the United Nations, we’re trying
to make people more comfortable with what we are trying
to do, and that is to move forward toward a military engagement,"
an unnamed U.S. official told the Boston Globe.
"We’re doing things just to make people in the international
community feel better."
Washington’s cynical war
makers and their mainstream media mouthpieces don’t
care that Bush’s "case" for war on Iraq is built
on a mountain of lies.
The Washington Post, hardly
a bastion of antiwar sentiment, concluded that the document
the White House has released to back up its claims "contains
little new information–and no bombshells–showing
that [Iraqi President Saddam] Hussein is producing new
weapons of mass destruction or has joined with terrorists
to threaten the United States or its interests abroad."
Even hawkish military analyst Anthony
Cordesman had to agree. "This is a glorified press release
that doesn’t come close to the information the U.S.
government made available on Soviet military power when
we were trying to explain the Cold War," Cordesman said.
"It’s clumsy and shallow…As an overall grade,
I’d give it a D-minus.
After trying and failing many times
to link Iraq to last year’s September 11 attacks,
the administration doesn’t even try anymore. Instead
we hear the familiar charges that Saddam "gassed his own
people" and "used weapons of mass destruction."
These charges are at least true.
But they omit the fact that Saddam was Washington’s
ally when he committed these atrocities. In fact, during
the 1980s Iran-Iraq War, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
was the U.S. government’s special envoy to Iraq.
Saddam used U.S.-provided satellite
intelligence to launch his weapons of mass destruction
against Iranian troops. And when he gassed 5,000 Iraqi
Kurds in 1988, U.S. officials shielded him from international
condemnation. Don’t expect the Bush administration’s
axis of liars to come clean about their own complicity
with Saddam.
But the biggest lie of all is the
one that Bush has been telling for months–that he
"hasn’t made up his mind" about going to war with
Iraq. In fact, a document written for the Bush campaign
two years ago and unearthed by the Glasgow Sunday Herald
shows that top administration officials were planning
for "regime change" in Iraq–before they took office.
September 11 merely gave the administration
the pretext it needed to push forward with plans to redraw
the map of the Middle East to suit U.S. interests. Diplomatic
tricks and congressional shenanigans aside, the Bush gang
is driving towards a horrific war in Iraq. We need to
expose their lies–and mobilize to stop them.
Content Courtesy of ISO
Interview With Noam Chomsky about US Warplans
by Noam Chomsky and Michael Albert; August 29, 2002
Various questions are circulating among people worried about
war. On August 29, 2002, Michael Albert put some of these
to Noam Chomsky, via email. Here are the questions and his
responses...
1. Has Saddam Hussein been as evil as mainstream media says?
Domestically? Internationally?
He is as evil as they come, ranking with Suharto and other
monsters of the modern era. No one would want to be within
his reach. But fortunately, his reach does not extend very
far.
Internationally, Saddam invaded Iran (with Western support),
and when that war was going badly turned to chemical weapons
(also with Western support). He invaded Kuwait and was quickly
driven out. A major concern in Washington right after the
invasion was that Saddam would quickly withdraw, putting
"his puppet in [and] everyone in the Arab world will be
happy" (Colin Powell, then Chief of Staff). President Bush
was concerned that Saudi Arabia might "bug out at the last
minute and accept a puppet regime in Kuwait" unless the
US prevented Iraqi withdrawal. The concern, in brief, was
that Saddam would pretty much duplicate what the US had
just done in Panama (except that Latin Americans were anything
but happy). From the first moment the US sought to avert
this "nightmare scenario." A story that should be looked
at with some care.
Saddam's worst crimes, by far, have been domestic, including
the use of chemical weapons against Kurds and a huge slaughter
of Kurds in the late 80s, barbaric torture, and every other
ugly crime you can imagine. These are at the top of the
list of terrible crimes for which he is now condemned, rightly.
It's useful to ask how frequently the impassioned denunciations
and eloquent expressions of outrage are accompanied by three
little words: "with our help."
The crimes were well known at once, but of no particular
concern to the West. Saddam received some mild reprimands;
harsh congressional condemnation was considered too extreme
by prominent commentators. The Reaganites and Bush 1 continued
to welcome the monster as an ally and valued trading partner
right through his worst atrocities and well beyond. Bush
authorized loan guarantees and sale of advanced technology
with clear applications for weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) right up to the day of the Kuwait invasion, sometimes
overriding congressional efforts to prevent what he was
doing. Britain was still authorizing export of military
equipment and radioactive materials a few days after the
invasion. When ABC correspondent and now ZNet Commentator
Charles Glass discovered biological weapons facilities (using
commercial satellites and defector testimony), his revelations
were immediately denied by the Pentagon and the story disappeared.
It was resurrected when Saddam committed his first real
crime, disobeying US orders (or perhaps misinterpreting
them) by invading Kuwait, and switched instantly from friend
to reincarnation of Attila the Hun. The same facilities
were then used to demonstrate his innately evil nature.
When Bush 1 announced new gifts to his friend in December
1989 (also gifts to US agribusiness and industry), it was
considered too insignificant even to report, though one
could read about it in Z magazine at the time, maybe nowhere
else. A few months later, shortly before he invaded Kuwait,
a high-level Senate delegation, headed by (later) Republican
presidential candidate Bob Dole, visited Saddam, conveying
the President's greetings and assuring the brutal mass murderer
that he should disregard the criticism he hears from maverick
reporters here. Saddam had even been able to get away with
attacking a US naval vessel, the USS Stark, killing several
dozen crewmen. That is a mark of real esteem. The only other
country to have been granted that privilege was Israel,
in 1967. In deference to Saddam, the State Department banned
all contacts with the Iraqi democratic opposition, maintaining
this policy even after the Gulf war, while Washington effectively
authorized Saddam to crush a Shi'ite rebellion that might
well have overthrown him -- in the interest of preserving
"stability," the press explained, nodding sagely.
That he's a major criminal is not in doubt. That's not changed
by the fact that the US and Britain regarded his major atrocities
as insignificant in the light of higher "reasons of state,"
before the Gulf war and even after -- facts best forgotten.
2. Looking into the future, is Saddam Hussein as dangerous
as mainstream media says?
The world would be better off if he weren't there, no doubt
about that. Surely Iraqis would. But he can't be anywhere
near as dangerous as he was when the US and Britain were
supporting him, even providing him with dual-use technology
that he could use for nuclear and chemical weapons development,
as he presumably did. 10 years ago the Senate Banking Committee
hearings revealed that the Bush administration was granting
licences for dual use technology and "materials which were
later utilized by the Iraq regime for nuclear missile and
chemical purposes." Later hearings added more, and there
are press reports and a mainstream scholarly literature
on the topic (as well as dissident literature).
The 1991 war was extremely destructive, and since then Iraq
has been devastated by a decade of sanctions, which probably
strengthened Saddam himself (by weakening possible resistance
in a shattered society), but surely reduced very significantly
his capacity for war-making or support for terror. Furthermore,
since 1991 his regime has been constrained by "no fly zones,"
regular overflights and bombing, and very tight surveillance.
Chances are that the events of Sept. 11 weakened him still
further. If there are any links between Saddam and al-Qaeda,
they would be far more difficult to maintain now because
of the sharply intensified surveillance and controls. That
aside, links are not very likely. Despite enormous efforts
to tie Saddam to the 9-11 attacks, nothing has been found,
which is not too surprising. Saddam and bin Laden were bitter
enemies, and there's no particular reason to suppose that
there have been any changes in that regard.
The rational conclusion is that Saddam is probably less
of a danger now than before 9-11, and far less of a threat
than when he was enjoying substantial support from the US-UK
(and many others). That raises a few questions. If Saddam
is such a threat to the survival of civilization today that
the global enforcer has to resort to war, why wasn't that
true a year ago? And much more dramatically, in early 1990?
3. How should the problem of the existence and use of weapons
of mass destruction in the world today be dealt with?
They should be eliminated. The non-proliferation treaty
commits countries with nuclear weapons to take steps towards
eliminating them. The biological and chemical weapons treaties
have the same goals. The main Security Council resolution
concerning Iraq (687, 1991) calls for eliminating weapons
of mass destruction and delivery systems from the Middle
East, and working towards a global ban on chemical weapons.
Good advice.
Iraq is nowhere near the lead in this regard. We might recall
the warning of General Lee Butler, head of Clinton's Strategic
Command in the early 90s, that "it is dangerous in the extreme
that in the cauldron of animosities that we call the Middle
East, one nation has armed itself, ostensibly, with stockpiles
of nuclear weapons, perhaps numbering in the hundreds, and
that inspires other nations to do so." He's talking about
Israel of course. The Israeli military authorities claim
to have air and armored forces that are larger and more
advanced than those of any European NATO power (Yitzhak
ben Israel, Ha'aretz, 4-16-02, Hebrew). They also announce
that 12% of their bombers and fighter aircraft are permanently
stationed in Eastern Turkey, along with comparable naval
and submarine forces in Turkish bases, and armored forces
as well, in case it becomes necessary to resort to extreme
violence once again to subdue Turkey's Kurdish population,
as in the Clinton years. Israeli aircraft based in Turkey
are reported to be flying reconnaisance flights along Iran's
borders, part of a general US-Israel-Turkey policy of threatening
Iran with attack and perhaps forceful partitioning. Israeli
analysts also report that joint US-Israel-Turkey air exercises
are intended as a threat and warning to Iran. And of course
to Iraq (Robert Olson, Middle East Policy, June 2002). Israel
is doubtless using the huge US air bases in Eastern Turkey,
where the US bombers are presumably nuclear-armed. By now
Israel is virtually an offshore US military base.
And the rest of the area is armed to the teeth as well.
If Iraq were governed by most Gandhi-like of foreseeable
leaders, it would be developing weapons systems if it could,
probably well beyond what it can today. That would very
likely continue, perhaps even accelerate, if the US takes
control of Iraq. India and Pakistan are US allies, but are
marching forward with the development of WMD and repeatedly
have come agonizingly close to using nuclear weapons. The
same is true of other US allies and clients.
That is likely to continue unless there is a general reduction
of armaments in the area.
Would Saddam agree to that? Actually, we don't know. In
early January 1991, Iraq apparently offered to withdraw
from Kuwait in the context of regional negotiations on reduction
of armaments, an offer that State Department officials described
as serious and negotiable. But we know no more about it,
because the US rejected it without response and the press
reported virtually nothing. It is, however, of some interest
that at that time -- right before the bombing -- polls revealed
that by 2-1 the US public supported the proposal that Saddam
had apparently made, preferring it to bombing. Had people
been allowed to know any of this, the majority would surely
have been far greater. Suppressing the facts was an important
service to the cause of state violence. Could such negotiations
have gotten anywhere? Only fanatical ideologues can be confident.
Could such ideas be revived? Same answer. One way to find
out is to try.
4. Some argue that there is ample justification for treating
Iraq's potential for weapons of mass destruction differently
from those of other countries because, under the terms of
Security Council Resolution 687, agreed to by Saddam Hussein,
Iraq is to be disarmed, in part as punishment for its flagrant
violation of international law in invading Kuwait. Is the
international community justified in trying to restrict
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction? If one accepts this
argument, as put, what would be the international ramifications?
Is there a different version of this argument with better
logic and methodology, and what would be its implications?
As noted, 687 has other provisions, rather significant ones.
The invasion of Kuwait is one of Saddam's lesser crimes.
It is not very different from one of the footnotes to US
crimes in its own traditional domains: the invasion of Panama
a few months earlier, which didn't have even a marginally
credible pretext. The main difference is that the US could
veto Security Council resolutions condemning the invasion,
disregard the harsh condemnations from the Latin American
democracies (barely reported), and basically do what it
liked. It's all removed from sanitized history for the same
reasons. As I mentioned, Washington feared that Saddam would
emulate the Panama invasion and worked hard to prevent it.
In the region itself, the invasion of Kuwait, criminal as
it was, doesn't compare with the US-supported Israeli invasion
of Lebanon, which left some 20,000 dead. And it's embarrassingly
easy to continue with much worse cases that we all know.
That aside, these arguments are somewhat beside the point.
Those who believe that the Security Council resolutions
of a decade ago (which said nothing about use of force)
indirectly authorize an invasion have a very easy way to
prove that they are serious in that claim: they can urge
the US to approach the Security Council for Chapter VII
authorization to use force. That will settle the matter.
Authorization could probably be obtained: a veto is unlikely.
But the US does not want such authorization, at least now,
just as it refused it when it chose to bomb Afghanistan,
though authorization would surely have been given. For such
reasons alone, these discussions are irrelevant.
As for the "international community," in practice, it means
the US and whoever will go along with it.
More generally, it would make good sense to try to implement
the non-proliferation treaty, the chemical and biological
weapons treaties, and the relevant provisions of 687. And
to proceed with more serious efforts at disarmament across
the board. But any such steps would require US acquiescence,
a remote contingency unless there are significant changes
here.
5. Hasn't the history of previous weapons inspections shown
that weapons inspectors can be fooled, delayed, and otherwise
prevented from actually accomplishing their task? Is there
a viable inspections method or related policy, and could
it be applied universally?
Sure they can be fooled. However, the weapons inspections
were vastly more effective than bombing in destroying Iraq's
military capacities, and appear to have been largely successful.
Going a step beyond, when was the last time there was a
meaningful (or any) international inspection of Israel's
nuclear and (probably) chemical weapons facilities? Or those
of the US? Inspection regimes should be established, and
universalized, but that again requires US acquiescence.
6. During the recent Congressional hearings on Iraq, one
witness stated that for inspections to be truly effective,
a rapid reaction military force would be needed, so that
Saddam Hussein could not prevent the inspectors from making
a surprise visit to some site where improper activity was
going on. The witness said there's no way Iraq would agree
to this, but by demanding such a force the U.S. would seize
the high moral ground. Is such a force a necessary component
of an effective inspection regime? Would the U.S. be on
high moral ground? What reciprocal demands might others
reasonably make of us?
Is the goal propaganda ("seizing the high moral ground")?
Or reducing the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)?
If the former, we can dismiss the matter. If the latter,
some obvious questions arise. Weapons inspection appears
to have been highly effective, even if imperfect. Scott
Ritter's testimony on the topic is compelling, and I know
of no serious refutation of it. Those who want to reduce
the threat of WMD will, therefore, try to create the conditions
for meaningful inspection, as required by resolution 687
and earlier ones, and supported by the actual international
community. For some years, the US has sought in every way
to block such eventualities. The inspections were used as
a cover for spying on Iraq, with the open intent of overthrowing
the regime and probably assassinating the leadership. Apart
from the violation of elementary norms, these practices
were sure to undermine the inspections regime, and to sharply
reduce the likelihood that Iraq would accept inspections.
Would Israel agree to inspection of its military facilities
by spies for Hamas? In 1998, Clinton withdrew the inspectors
in preparation for bombing -- acts that have been reconstructed
in propaganda as Iraqi expulsion of the inspectors. The
US-UK bombing was carefully timed to coincide with an emergency
meeting of the Security Council on inspections, hence to
demonstrate the utter contempt of the enforcers for the
UN. And the bombing was another blow to the renewal of inspections.
Since then, Washington has been insisting that even if Iraq
accepts the most intrusive inspections by American spies
seeking to prepare the ground for invasion, it will not
make any difference. In Cheney's recent version, "A return
of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of [Saddam's]
compliance with U.N. resolutions." This stance amounts to
pleading with Iraq not to accept inspectors. It has been
reported, not implausibly, that one reason why Washington
forced out the highly respected director of the UN Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Jose Bustani, was
that he was seeking to arrange inspections of chemical weapons
in Iraq, thus interfering with Washington's efforts to prevent
WMD inspections. The hypocrisy was particularly stunning,
mainstream commentators pointed out, after the Bush administration
undermined the Chemical and Biological weapons conventions
by refusing at the last minute to ratify enforcement protocols,
in part because of its opposition to arms agreements, in
part to protect commercial secrets of US corporations, and
possibly in part to keep its own violations of the conventions
from too much exposure (though some has already leaked).
So back to the first question: is the goal to block inspections,
or to expedite them? The witness, as quoted, evidently seeks
to block them, and therefore need not be taken seriously.
If, in contrast, the goal is to expedite inspections, then
it's necessary to address the US government as well as Iraq.
Just to summarize quickly, WMD programs make the world a
more dangerous place, Saddam's in particular. And the problem
should be addressed in such a way as to make the world safer.
The best approach would be global: treaties with meaningful
provisions, and universal inspections to verify adherence
to them. The next best approach would be something similar
at a regional level. Both approaches would require US acquiescence,
but that's a remote contingency, at least right now. Sensible
people should try to change that. The next best approach
is to return inspectors to Iraq, alone. Every effort should
be made to achieve that result -- at least by those who
hope to reduce serious threats, not just to find a pretext
for war. The worst approach would be to try to prevent the
return of inspectors along the lines just discussed. That
continues to be US policy, in an effort to set the stage
for an invasion. The planned invasion will strike another
blow at the structure of international law and treaties
that has been laboriously constructed over the years, in
an effort to reduce the use of violence in the world, which
has had such horrifying consequences. Apart from other consequences,
an invasion is likely to encourage other countries to develop
WMD, including a successor Iraqi government, and to lower
the barriers against resort to force by others to achieve
their objectives, including Russia, India, and China.
7. It is sometimes said that Saddam Hussein wouldn't be
crazy enough to launch a nuclear weapon at the U.S. or (more
realistically) Israel, knowing the inevitable consequences.
But wouldn't a nuclear-armed Iraq be able to conventionally
attack weaker neighboring states, knowing that his victims
could not successfully call on the U.S. (or even the UN)
for assistance, because Washington would fear a nuclear
strike on Tel Aviv?
All sorts of outlandish possibilities can be imagined. That's
kept many people employed at Rand and other think-tanks
ever since WMD became available. This is hardly one of the
more credible examples. One reason is that the situation
will almost certainly not arise. The scenario assumes that
Saddam has provided credible evidence that he has WMD available
and is capable of using them. Otherwise, such weapons are
not a threat or a deterrent at all. But if there ever is
any indication that he does have significant WMD capacity,
he'll be wiped out before he can threaten anyone with invasion.
Suppose, however, just to play the game, we accept the absurd
assumption that the US and Israel will just sit there quietly
while Saddam brandishes WMD as a potential deterrent, in
advance of the invasion of some.other country. Then the
US and Israel would instantly respond to the invasion, expelling
him (and probably destroying Iraq). His WMD would be no
deterrent at all. A sufficient reason is that to allow his
invasion to succeed would leave him as a far greater threat.
Furthermore, it would be assumed that he would not use whatever
WMD capacity he has because that would mean instant suicide,
and if he was bent on suicide he would have used his WMD
against Israel (or someone else) even before invading another
country. The scenario has such slight plausibility that
it is hardly worth considering in comparison with real problems
that do not have to be conjured up by fevered imaginations.
If one wants to play such games, why not take some more
plausible scenarios. Here's one. Suppose that the US shifts
policy and joins the international consensus on a two-state
Israel-Palestine settlement. Suppose, for example, the US
endorses the recent Saudi plan adopted by the Arab League.
Suppose Israel reacts by threatening the US -- not threatening
to bomb it, but in other ways. For example, suppose Israel
sends bombers over the Saudi oil fields (maybe nuclear armed,
but that's unnecessary), just to indicate what it can do
to the world if the US doesn't get on board again. It would
be too late to react, because Israel could then carry out
its warnings. That scenario has a certain plausibility because
apparently it actually happened, 20 years ago, when the
Saudi government floated a similar plan, violently opposed
by Israel. According to the Israeli press, Israel reacted
by sending bombers over the oil fields, as a warning to
the US, but one that was unnecessary because the Reagan
administration joined Israel in rejecting that possibility
for a political settlement, as it has consistently done.
True, Israel might have been facing destruction, but one
might argue that Israel's strategy allows that possibility.
As far back as the 1950s, leaders of the then-ruling Labor
Party advised that Israel should "go crazy" if the US wouldn't
go along with its demands, and the "Samson complex" has
been an element of planning -- how seriously, we don't know
-- ever since. So we should bomb Israel right away, before
it has a chance to carry out these evil plots.
Do I believe any of this? Of course not. It's nonsensical.
However, it doesn't compare too badly with the scenario
about Iraq.
It should be added that there are circumstances under which
Saddam might use WMD, assuming he has the capacity. If Iraq
is invaded with the clear intention of capturing or more
likely killing him, he would have every incentive to go
for broke, since he'd have nothing to lose. But it is hard
to imagine other circumstances.
8. How will the Iraqi people react to a U.S. attack on Iraq?
What are the likely humanitarian consequences of a U.S.
war?
No one has a clue. Not Donald Rumsfeld, not me, no one.
One can imagine a delightful scenario: a few bombs fall,
the Republican Guards rebel and overthrow Saddam, crowds
cheer as US soldiers march in while the band plays "God
Bless America," the people of the region hail the liberator
who proceeds to turn Iraq into an image of American democracy
and a modernizing center for the entire region -- and one
that produces just enough oil to keep the price within the
range that the US prefers, breaking the OPEC stranglehold.
And Santa Claus smiles benignly from his sleigh. One can
easily imagine rather more grim outcomes. That's a normal
concomitant of the decision to resort to massive violence,
and one of the many reasons why those who advocate that
course have a very heavy burden of proof to bear. Needless
to say, neither Rumsfeld nor Cheney nor any of the intellectuals
urging war against Iraq have remotely begun to meet this
burden.
9. What in your view are the true motives propelling a possible
war?
There are longstanding background reasons, which are well
known. Iraq has the second largest oil reserves in the world.
It has always been likely that sooner or later, the US would
try to restore this enormous prize to Western control, meaning
now US control, denying privileged access to others. But
those considerations have held for years. 9-11 offered new
opportunities to pursue these goals under the pretext of
a "war on terror" -- thin pretexts, but probably sufficient
for propaganda purposes. The planned war can serve immediate
domestic needs as well. It's hardly a secret that the Bush
administration is carrying out an assault against the general
population and future generations in the interest of narrow
sectors of wealth and power that it serves with loyalty
that exceeds even the usual norms. Under those circumstances,
it is surely advisable to divert attention away from health
care, social security, deficits, destruction of the environment,
development of new weapons systems that may literally threaten
survival, and a long list of other unwelcome topics. The
traditional, and reasonable, device is to terrify the population.
"The whole aim of practical politics," the great American
satirist H. L. Mencken once said, is "to keep the public
alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing
it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary."
In fact the menaces invoked are rarely imaginary, though
they are typically inflated beyond all reason. That's a
good part of the history of "practical politics," not only
here of course. It doesn't take much skill to evoke an image
of Saddam Hussein as the ultimate force of evil about to
destroy the world, maybe the universe. And with the population
huddling in fear as our gallant forces miraculously overcome
this awesome foe, perhaps they won't pay attention to what
is being done to them, and may even join the chorus of distinguished
intellectuals chanting praises for Our Leaders. The US preponderance
of power is so extraordinary that there will be plenty in
reserve if things seem to be going wrong. And if that happens
down the road, it can all be shovelled deep into the memory
hole, or blamed on someone else, or maybe on our naive faith
that others are as benign as we are. It's pretty easy: there's
a treasure trove of experience to draw from.
10. Some advocates of war have suggested that if the economic
sanctions on Iraq are as horrible as the left claims, then
a war, even a war that killed 100,000 civilians, would be
a humanitarian blessing, since, presumably, after a U.S.
victory there would be no more sanctions. How do you answer
this argument?
I've heard some zany arguments in the past, but this must
break some new records. I suspect it was offered tongue
in cheek. Note first the conception of "the left": the UN's
humanitarian coordinators (Denis Halliday, Hans van Sponeck)
who know more about the country than anyone else, UNICEF,
etc. It's a bit like saying that the left is concerned about
global warming -- and tells us something about where those
who question "the claim" place themselves on the political
spectrum.
But that aside, the argument does have appeal. For example,
we could offer Iran assistance in conquering Israel and
carrying out appropriate "regime change," so that suicide
bombings would stop. Since the war advocates doubtless regard
suicide bombing as atrocious, they should be calling for
that. Or, we could help Russia grind Chechnya to dust, so
that Chechens would no longer have to suffer Russian terror
and atrocities. The possibilities are endless.
11. What will the implications of war be in the Mideast,
and also other parts of the world? Do U.S. elites care?
Elites of course care, though the small group that holds
the reins of power currently may not care very much. They
evidently believe that they have such overwhelming force
at their command that it doesn't really matter much what
others think: if they don't go along, they'll be dismissed,
or if they are in the way, pulverized. The thinking in high
places was made pretty clear when Prince Abdullah of Saudi
Arabia visited the US in April to urge the administration
to pay some attention to the reaction in the Arab world
to its strong support for Israeli terror and repression.
He was told, in effect, that the US did not care what he
or other Arabs think. A high official explained that "if
he thought we were strong in Desert Storm, we're 10 times
as strong today. This was to give him some idea what Afghanistan
demonstrated about our capabilities." A senior defense analyst
gave a simple gloss: others will "respect us for our toughness
and won't mess with us." That stand has precedents that
need not be mentioned. But in the post-9/11 world it gains
new force. Are they right? Could be. Or maybe the world
will blow up in their face, perhaps after a "decent interval,"
as it's called in diplomacy. Again, resort to large-scale
violence has highly unpredictable consequences, as history
reveals and common sense should tell us anyway. That's why
sane people avoid it, in personal relations or international
affairs, unless a very powerful argument is offered to overcome
"the sickly inhibitions against the use of military force"
(to borrow the phrase of Reaganite intellectual Norman Podhoretz,
paraphrasing Goebbels).
12. Christopher Hitchens makes the point that while Saudi
Arabia, Scowcroft, and Kissinger oppose war with Iraq because
of its potential destabilizing effect in the region, the
left should not care about the stability of the reactionary
and corrupt regimes of the Middle East. Does this refute
a commonly-heard objection to war?
It is hard to imagine what the point is supposed to be.
The left has always been strenuously opposed to US support
for "the reactionary and corrupt regimes of the Middle East,"
and would of course welcome their "destabilization" in favor
of something better. On the other hand, if "destabilization"
brought to power something even worse -- say, what Hitchens
calls "Islamic fascism" -- then the left would oppose it,
and I presume he would too. So what is the point?
I don't see how these considerations bear on any "objection
to war," commonly heard or not, at least from the left.
What Scowcroft and Kissinger may have in mind is another
matter.
|
 Solidarity
Members Face Police State At IMF/World Bank Protest
WASHINGTON,
D.C - Two Solidarity representatives were pulled from the street
by Metro Police after they and other protesters attempted to
block International Monetary Fund and World Bank delegates from
exiting their annual meeting Saturday.
"It's
an institution set up to undermine democracy," said Ryan
Husak, part of a mobile team whose job was to fortify weak spots
in a 5,000 person human wall that attempted to block exits of
the the building.
The
last human Barricade to fall was on 20th Street and Pennsylvania
Avenue, where protesters had joined themselves together with
duct tape. Police arrested more than 600 anti-war protesters
the previous day.
Solidarity
members had phone numbers scrawled on their arms in permanent
marker for legal assistance in the event they were arrested.
"All
you have to say is, I want to see my lawyer.' You don't have
to sign a rights card. They [the police] will lie to you,"
said an organizer during a pre-convergence briefing.
No
solidarity members were detaine
| NOT
IN THE MAINSTREAM MEDIA....
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Apr
23 2002 |
| April
20-23 Video Scenes & Conversations |
 In
The Streets With Tariq Ali:
The US War on the World:
From Venezuela to Palestine
Tariq Ali, Pakistani-British writer, was impressed
by the large numbers of protesters that came out this weekend
to condemn the US and Israeili states' use of terrorism
as a pretense for making war and "remapping the world" according
to their own interests. Ali claims that far from creating
a safer world, these policies will destabilize the Middle
East and harden attitudes of anti-Israel/American resistance.
"The US is encouraging a breakdown of order on the global
scale," he warned. Watch the interview for the connections
Ali sees between the Middle East crisis and recent events
in Venezuela, Argentina, and elsewhere.
Watch
this  video
interview of Tariq Ali in the streets protesting the
Occupation.
-
Tariq Ali speaking at the April
20th Rally
- Tariq Ali's Sept 19th, 2001 essay: A Political
Solution Is Required
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